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[T] he United States Supreme Court has now, after the game is over and
the score is in, said the rules are changed and the game must be played
again. The trial judge was right at the time of the trial, but wrong at
the time of the appeal.'
In recent years, on almost an annual basis, the United States
Supreme Court has announced significant changes in the constitutional
rights of the accused criminal. One question confronting state courts
every time a new right is announced is whether the right is to be ap-
plied retroactively or prospectively. At common law all overruling de-
cisions were applied retroactively.2 However, it is currently established
law that "the Court may in the interest of justice make the rule pro-
spective."13
This comment will analyze recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court with a view to discovering why one particular new
right is applied retroactively while another is not. This writer further
hopes to determine what "common threads," if any, may be found run-
ning through these recent decisions so as to provide some aid in gauging
whether future decisions should be applied retroactively. Lastly, this
comment will examine a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida concerning retroactivity, to determine whether or not it comports
with the criteria set forth by the United States Supreme Court.
* Former Associate Editor of the University of Miami Law Review and Student In-
structor in Freshman Research and Writing.
1. Lament of Judge Overton in Branch v. State, 212 So.2d 29, 33 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968),
where the court was forced to apply a recent retroactive decision.
2. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-23 (1965).
3. Id. at 628.
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I. THE RETROACTIVITY FORMULA
The announced test for determining retroactivity, deceptive in its
simplicity, is:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the
extent of the reliance of law enforcement authorities on the
old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of jus-
tice of a retroactive application of the new standards.4
Generally, it is factor (a) which weighs in favor of retroactive appli-
cation and factors (b) and (c) which militate against it. Thus, the
formula really breaks down to a "weighing process" to determine whether
the purpose served by the new right is so critical as to outweigh the
severe impact which retroactive application might have.
The United States Supreme Court has found the "scales" to be
tipped in favor of retroactivity in those instances in which the purpose
of the new right is an enhancement of the integrity of the fact-finding
process. Thus, if the new right provides an added protection against
"the clear danger of convicting the innocent,"' it relates to the integ-
rity of the fact-finding, i.e., the guilt-determining, process and will be
entitled to retroactive application.
[R]etroactivity depends upon a pragmatic balancing of the
public interests against the gravity of the right involved. Thus,
if the rule or newly established standard goes to the very in-
tegrity of the fact-finding process by which liberty is taken...
retroactivity should be accorded even though it may result in
wholesale [re] consideration of the standards by which fac-
tual determinations are made.'
The foregoing also indicates that certain other factors are not
important in determining retroactivity. The first of these is the "im-
portance" of the right involved. In Johnson v. New Jersey7 it was em-
phasized "that the choice between retroactivity and non-retroactivity
in no way turns on the value of the constitutional guarantee involved."8
For example, the Fourth Amendment right to privacy, which protects
a citizen against unreasonable searches and seizures, has been character-
ized as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men." 9 However, even though the protection of the Fourth
Amendment is critically important, a violation of it does not affect the
integrity of the fact-finding, i.e., the truth-determining process. In short,
the fact that the prosecution has introduced at trial evidence damaging
4. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296-97 (1967).
5. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
6. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396-97 (10th Cir. 1968).
7. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
8. Id. at 728.
9. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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to an accused which was acquired by a flagrant violation of the Fourth
Amendment in no way affects the probative value of that evidence on
the issue of the accused's guilt or innocence. Violation of the right does
not present a danger of convicting the innocent. While the right is im-
portant, its purpose is not an enhancement of the integrity of the fact-
finding process.
The second factor which is irrelevant in determining retroactivity
is the particular amendment of the Constitution involved. The United
States Supreme Court has stressed that the "retroactivity . . . of a
rule is not automatically determined by the provision of the Constitution
upon which the dictate is based."'" For example, retroactivity has most
frequently been accorded to rights under the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel." However, the right to have an attorney present during po-
lice interrogations does not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process.
The fact that an accused confessed without having an attorney present,
so long as the statement is a voluntary one, does not create a danger of
convicting the innocent. Thus, the purpose served by the presence of
counsel at interrogations is not to enhance the integrity of the fact-find-
ing process.
It therefore becomes apparent that the decision to apply a new
right retroactively requires a "weighing" of the factors involved in the
formula and a finding that the purpose of the new standard is to prevent
conviction of the innocent and would therefore outweigh the impact
which retroactivity would have.'2
II. APPLICATIONS OF THE FORMULA BY THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A. The Right to Counsel in the Adjudicatory Stages
It is manifestly evident that the right to counsel at the trial relates
to the very integrity of the fact-finding process. The indigent layman
defendant who is forced to defend himself clearly stands a greater
risk of improper conviction than an accused who has the benefit of
counsel:
Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without
a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceedings against
10. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966).
11. See note 18 injra.
12. In this area at least, the Court appears to be undeserving of critic's charges that it
sets free "guilty" persons. No matter how important the new right may be, it will not be
retroactively applied if its only result would be to set free criminals who were reliably
tund to be guilty.
1969]
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him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger
of conviction because he does not know how to establish his in-
nocence.
18
Thus, when an absolute right to counsel was applied to state criminal
trials, 4 it was applied retroactively 5 because the "basic purpose of
a trial is the determination of truth, and it is self-evident that to
deny a lawyer's help . . . is to impede that purpose and to infect a
criminal proceeding with the clear danger of convicting the innocent."' 6
It should further be emphasized that the fact-finding process as
it relates to the necessity of counsel is not "confined to . . . the trial
on the merits."' It is readily apparent that the Supreme Court has
considered the entire adjudicatory process (as opposed to the investi-
gatory process) to be a part of the fact-finding process as it relates to
the retroactive application of the right to counsel. The right to coun-
sel at a preliminary hearing, arraignment, trial, sentencing, probation
revocation, or appeal has always been retroactively applied. 18 In a
recent decision in which the Court applied the right to counsel to
sentencing and probation revocation it was stated:
There was no occasion in Gideon to enumerate the var-
ious stages in a criminal proceeding at which counsel was re-
quired but, [prior decisions of this Court], when the Betts
requirement of special circumstances is stripped away by
Gideon, clearly stand for the proposition that appointment of
counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of a criminal
proceeding where substantial rights of the accused may be af-
fected. 19
In dealing with this same issue, i.e., the right to counsel at sentencing
and probation revocation, it was made clear that the retroactivity of
the right to counsel applies uniformly throughout the adjudicatory
process. The Court held:
The right to counsel at sentencing is no different. As in these
other cases, the right . . . relates to "the very integrity of the
fact-finding process" . . . . The right to counsel at sentencing
must, therefore, be treated like the right to counsel at other
stages of adjudication.2"
13. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
14. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15. Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964); Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2
(1963).
16. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
17. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 160 (1957).
18. See Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S.
52 (1961); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2
(1968); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
19. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967).
20. McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968).
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From these decisions the actual definition of the fact-finding pro-
cess becomes clear. It is not simply the "trial" where guilt or innocence
is determined, but every stage of the adjudicatory process where the
substantial rights of the accused may be affected. An application of
the right to counsel to any one of these stages will be effective retro-
actively.
B. The Right to Counsel in the Investigatory Stages
The United States Supreme Court has consistently refused to
retroactively apply its right to counsel decisions to the investigatory
stages. This clear distinction between the right to counsel in the in-
vestigatory versus the adjudicatory process is ample illustration of
the fact that retroactivity is not automatically determined by the con-
stitutional provision involved, e.g., the Sixth Amendment. The basic
reason why retroactivity has been denied in this area is that the absence
of counsel in the investigatory stages does not materially increase the
danger of convicting the innocent.
In Escobedo v. Illinois21 and Miranda v. Arizona,22 accused persons
were granted a right to counsel during police custodial interrogations.
In Johnson v. New Jersey,23 a divided Court refused to accord these
decisions retroactive effect.
Two major factors militated against retroactive application. The
first of these was that the purpose served by the presence of counsel at
interrogations was not to prevent the innocent from being convicted, but
to
guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrim-
ination . . . [and to] assure that the person who responds to
interrogation while in custody does so with intelligent under-
standing of his right to remain silent and of the consequences
which may flow from relinquishing it.
24
Thus, the real purpose of these decisions was not an enhancement of
that all-important factor in determining retroactivity-the integrity of
the fact-finding process.
The second factor which militated against retroactivity was the
existence of previously-announced safeguards which did avert the danger
of convicting the innocent. Specifically, the Court emphasized that all
prisoners could "invoke a substantive test of voluntariness which . . .
has become increasingly meticulous through the years ' 25 in order to
attack the use of coerced confessions which "may well be untrustworthy
by their very nature."2
21. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
22. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
23. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
24. Id. at 729-30.
25. Id. at 730.
26. Id. at 729.
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It was only after the Court concluded that because of the two
foregoing factors failure to retroactively apply Escobedo and Miranda
would not increase the danger of leaving innocent persons in prison,
that attention was directed to another factor-the reliance which law
enforcement authorities had placed on prior law. Stating that "[p]rior
to Escobedo and Miranda, however, we had expressly declined to con-
demn an entire process of in-custody interrogation solely because
[counsel was not provided], '  the Court concluded that the heavy
impact which retroactive application of these decisions would have,
when contrasted with their minimal enhancement of the integrity of
the fact-finding process, would tip the scales of the weighing process
against the retroactive application of Escobedo and Miranda.
In United States v. Wade28 and Gilbert v. California20 an absolute
right to counsel was applied to lineups and other pre-trial confrontations
for identification purposes. However, in Stovall v. Denno ° the Court
refused to apply this right retroactively.
The purpose served by the Wade and Gilbert standards was the
prevention of mistaken identifications achieved through suggestive con-
frontations,81 e.g., a one man "lineup" or placing a Negro in a lineup
with four Caucasians. In this regard the Court appeared to be on
shakier ground, in denying retroactivity, than in the confession cases.
An unfairly conducted lineup would impair the integrity of the fact-
finding process by creating a danger of convicting the innocent. However,
the Court, as in the confession cases, avoided this pitfall by referring
to other safeguards which did apply retroactively.
If a lineup conducted prior to Wade and Gilbert "was so unneces-
sarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification"32
as to amount to a deprivation of due process, a prisoner could obtain
relief. 3 Thus, as in the confession cases, the reliability of the fact-finding
process was protected by independent safeguards which did apply
retroactively. This being the case, the reliance which "law enforcement
officials of the Federal Government and all the 50 states"34 had placed
on the prior rule not requiring counsel again tipped the scales against
retroactivity.
In summary, the right to counsel at police interrogations and lineups
was not retroactively applied because other safeguards, which did apply
retroactively, protected the integrity of the fact-finding process and
thereby prevented the innocent from being convicted. In these situa-
27. Id. at 731.
28. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
29. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
30. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
31. Id. at 297.
32. Id. at 302.
33. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
34. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299 (1967).
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tions, the reliance of law enforcement authorities on the prior rule and
the serious impact of retroactivity combined to outweigh the first factor
(to enhance the integrity of the fact-finding process) and thus prevent
a retroactive application.
C. The Search and Seizure Cases
Mapp v. Ohio3" required all states to exclude from evidence ma-
terials which were the product of an unreasonable search and seizure.
In Linkletter v. Walker" the Court refused to apply the exclusionary
rule retroactively. The purpose served by the exclusionary rule was
not the prevention of convicting innocent persons, i.e., enhancement of
the integrity of the fact-finding process; rather, it was "the enforcement
of the Fourth Amendment [by providing] an effective deterrent to law-
less police action."37 Since the lawfulness vel non of the manner in
which the evidence was seized in no way affected its relevancy and
reliability, the impact and reliance factors clearly were sufficient to
outweigh the non-existent impact on the integrity of the fact-finding
process; in other words, the fact that the search was unreasonable did
not lead to the conviction of innocent persons.3 1
In a related area, the Court held in Lee v. Florida"9 that a state
must exclude from evidence wiretap conversations which its police have
obtained in violation of the Federal Communications Act. The Court
refused to apply this rule retroactively in Fuller v. Alaska,4 ° basing its
holding on the reasoning used in the Linkletter case; that the purpose
of the rule is the enforcement of federal rights, not the enhancement of
the fact-finding process.
Thus, since the exclusionary evidence rules do nothing to enhance
the integrity of the fact-finding process, retroactivity has not been ac-
corded them. In these cases the reliance and impact factors prevent
retroactive application.
D. The Fifth Amendment Cases
In Jackson v. Denno4' the Court held that the voluntariness of a
confession must initially be determined by the trial judge out of the
presence of the jury. This rule was applied retroactively.42
The purpose of the Jackson rule was to insure that the jury does
not consider a coerced confession in determining the accused's guilt.4"
35. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
36. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
37. Id. at 636-37.
38. Id. at 638-39.
39. 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
40. 393 U.S. 80 (1968).
41. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
42. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 727-28 (1966).
43. Id. at 729.
1969]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
The right to have only truly voluntary confessions considered by the
jury does relate to the integrity of the fact-finding process, since "if
coerced they may well be untrustworthy by their very nature."44 Be-
cause the right went to the very integrity of the fact-finding (guilt-de-
termining) process, the reliance and impact factors did not operate to
prevent a holding of retroactivity.
In Griffin v. California45 it was held that state prosecutors could
no longer comment upon the defendant's failure to take the stand and
testify. The Court refused to apply the "no comment" rule retroactively
in Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott 46 because the purpose of the
new rule was not the correction of a serious flaw in the fact-finding
process.
The reasons behind the "no comment" rule "do not relate to pro-
tecting the innocent from conviction, but rather to preserving the in-
tegrity of a judicial system in which even the guilty are not to be
convicted unless the prosecution 'shoulder[s] the entire load'. 47 In
fact, the Court had previously stated that the defendant's failure to
testify may well be a reasonable indicator of guilt or innocence.48 Thus
again, when the Court was confronted with a new rule the purpose
of which was not to correct a serious defect in the fact-finding process,
the other two factors combined to prevent retroactive application.
E. Other Cases
The use of a non-testifying defendant's confession which implicates
a co-defendant in a joint trial was condemned in Bruton v. United
States.9 This new standard was applied retroactively because it was
designed to correct a serious flaw in the fact-finding process5° of the
old standard, which was that an instruction to the jury to consider the
confession only against its maker was sufficient to protect the non-
confessing defendant's rights."' In Bruton the Court recognized that, as
a practical matter, the jury often cannot, instruction notwithstanding,
ignore the reference to the non-confessor. 2 Here again, because the
danger of convicting the innocent was present, retroactive application
was required.
It should also be noted that the Court took this occasion to reiterate
that if the new rule does correct a serious flaw in the fact-finding process,
44. Id.
45. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
46. 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
47. Id. at 415.
48. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 56 (1947).
49. 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968).
50. Roberts v. Russell, 394 U.S. 440 (1968).
51. Deli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
52. Bruton v. United States, 381 U.S. 123 (1968).
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then all the prior reliance in the world will not prevent a retroactive
application. The Court stated that "even if the impact of retroactivity
may be significant, the constitutional error [herein] presents a serious
risk that the issue of guilt or innocence may not have been reliably de-
termined. ' 53
The right to trial by jury under federal standards was extended to
state criminal trials and criminal contempt hearings in Duncan v.
Louisiana14 and Bloom v. Illinois.55 This right was held not to be
retroactive in DeStefano v. Woods.5" The key reason retroactivity was
denied was, again, that the decisions did not involve a serious flaw in
the fact-finding process. The purpose of the right to jury trial is that
"in the context of the institutions and practices by which we adopt and
apply our criminal laws, . . . [it] generally tends to prevent arbitrariness
and repression.""7 This general tendency was not sufficient to outweigh
the prior reliance by officials and the heavy impact of retroactivity.
III. GUIDELINES FOR GAUGING FUTURE DECISIONS
It should be readily apparent from the foregoing decisions that the
retroactivity formula is deceptive in its simplicity. Although the same
formula is applied to every new right, the results achieved have been
something less than uniform. However, there are certain constant threads
which may be used to determine whether a new right may or may not be
applied retroactively.
The first and most constant trend is an application of the right to
counsel to any one of the steps in the adjudicatory process-the right
to an attorney in a court room. Every time the Court has applied this
right to any one of these steps it has applied the right retroactively.
The second important guideline is the purpose of the new rule as
it relates to preventing the possibility of convicting innocent persons,
a factor closely related to the first right. If the rule does relate to this
goal, the Court will simply ignore the reliance and impact factors and
apply the right retroactively.
Thirdly, if the new standard is not really intended to protect the
innocent from conviction, then the new rule will not be retroactively
applied. The search and seizure cases clearly demonstrate this point.58
Fourthly, in case of doubt, it should be determined whether there
are certain safeguards already existing in the area. If any exist, this
may tip a questionable issue in favor of non-retroactivity. The existence
of other safeguards appeared to weigh heavily in the Court's decision
53. Roberts v. Russell, - U.S. -, 88 S. Ct. 1921, 1922 (1968).
54. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
55. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
56. 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
57. Id. at 2095.
58. See text at notes 35-40 supra.
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not to apply retroactively the right to counsel in the investigatory
stages.50
These four guidelines may well be as deceptive in their simplicity
as the retroactivity formula itself. However, they are based upon the
patterns which the Supreme Court has exhibited in specific applications
of the formula. A better understanding of the rules might well be
achieved by examining a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Florida on the issue of retroactivity.
IV. AN APPLICATION OF THE FORMULA BY THE
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
A. Introduction
In the decision of In Re Gault6" the United States Supreme Court
imposed an absolute right to counsel at juvenile delinquency hearings.
Florida had not previously recognized this right, since such hearings
were considered civil in nature."' Florida was therefore confronted with
the issue of whether Gault was to be retroactively applied to vitiate ju-
venile hearings which were held prior to Gault and without the benefit
of counsel.
This was not the first time a right to counsel decision posed serious
problems for the administration of justice in Florida. When the United
States Supreme Court, in Gideon v. Wainwright,6 announced an absolute
right to counsel at criminal felony trials and applied the right retro-
actively,63 convicted felons flocked to the courts in such a rush as to
practically equal the one which occurred when gold was discovered
in California. Within ten months of the Gideon decision, "nine hundred
seventy-six prisoners had been released outright from Florida peni-
tentiaries, the authorities feeling that they could not successfully be
retried. Another five hundred were back in the courts, and petitions
from hundreds more were awaiting consideration." '64
The first time the Supreme Court of Florida was confronted with
the issue of retroactivity as applied to juveniles was in State v. Stein-
hauer,6 5 where it decided, perhaps understandably in view of its prior
agonies, 6  that "Gideon's Trumpet" would not sound again. The
Steinhauer case dealt not with a delinquency hearing but with a waiver
59. See text at notes 21-34 supra.
60. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
61. In re T.W.P., 192 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1966); State v. Dennis, 185 So.2d 12 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1966).
62. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
63. Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964).
64. A. LEwIs, GmEON's TRUMPET 205 (1964).
65. 216 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1968).
66. The flood of habeas corpus petitions filed in the Supreme Court of Florida became
so overwhelming that they forced the promulgation of a new collateral remedy, to wit: FLA.
R. CaRm. P. 1.850. See Roy v. Wainwright, 151 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1963).
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of jurisdiction hearing. Under Florida law the juvenile court has ex-
clusive jurisdiction to try all juveniles under seventeen years of age
for violations of the law.67 The juvenile court does, however, have dis-
cretionary authority to waive its jurisdiction and allow the juvenile
to be tried as an adult when the juvenile is fourteen or over and it
appears that he has committed a felony.6"
It should be emphasized that it is in regard to waiver of jurisdic-
tion hearings that the retroactivity vel non of Gault is crucial. In
Florida, even though a delinquent may theoretically be incarcerated
until his majority,69 delinquents are, in fact, not committed for more
than six months due to the overcrowding of facilities.70 Thus the retro-
activity of Gault as applied to delinquency adjudications is essentially
now a moot issue, since Gault was decided over two years ago and
pre-Gault delinquency commitments would have long since expired.
However, when juvenile jurisdiction is waived the juvenile is tried as
an adult and faces adult-length commitment. Since jurisdiction is
waived in cases involving serious felonies and recidivists, most of those
juveniles who were tried as adults prior to Gault are still subject to
incarceration. 71 The Steinhauer decision of the Supreme Court of Florida
was, therefore, a vitally important one.
B. The Factual Setting of the Steinhauer Decision
In 1966, Jerry Lee Steinhauer, a sixteen year old juvenile, broke
and entered two dwellings in Dade County. Jurisdiction for these of-
fenses was waived by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for
Dade County, and Jerry was convicted in the Criminal Court of Record
and sentenced to ten years in prison. Jerry subsequently filed a motion
to vacate judgment and sentence alleging, inter alia, that he did not
have counsel at the waiver of jurisdiction phase and that he had not been
informed of his right to counsel. The motion to vacate was summarily
denied on the ground that Jerry did not have a right to counsel at
the waiver of jurisdiction phase of the juvenile proceedings. The Third
District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the lower court, holding
that the right to counsel announced in Gault applied retroactively to
juvenile waiver of jurisdiction proceedings.72 On certiorari, the Supreme
Court of Florida reversed and remanded, holding that Gault did not
apply retroactively to "the mere waiver of jurisdiction phase," although
the court suggested that it might apply retroactively to a hearing on
an adjudication for delinquency.71
67. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(6), 39.02(2) (1967).
68. FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6) (1967).
69. FLA. STAT. § 39.11(3) (1967).
70. Record at 250, Richardson v. State ex rel. Milton, 219 So.2d 77 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
71. For an analysis of the factors which decide the waiver question see In re B.P.W.,
214 So.2d 365, 367-68 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
72. Steinhauer v. State, 206 So.2d 25 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
73. "The right to counsel cases . . . all recognized the essentiality of the assistance of
19691
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It is this writer's opinion that the court was correct when it sug-
gested that Gault applied retroactively to delinquency hearings. 4 It is
submitted, however, that the court was incorrect in holding that a
waiver of jurisdiction hearing was significantly distinguishable in this
regard.
C. The Rationale of the Steinhauer Decision
The first problem confronting the court was to decide whether the
case involved a constitutional issue. The waiver of jurisdiction in ques-
tion occurred on August 23, 1966. This was seven months after the
United States Supreme Court decision of Kent v. United States,75 which,
in reversing a District of Columbia criminal case, held in part that an
absolute right to counsel existed at the previously held juvenile waiver
of jurisdiction hearing. The Florida Supreme Court concluded, however,
that Kent did not directly apply since it was based on an interpretation
of the District of Columbia Code.76
Jerry, however, was not yet out of court. Proceeding to analyze the
Gault decision, the Florida court concluded that the numerous references
to Kent meant that the United States Supreme Court had "adapted
its views on statutorily created protections to broad constitutional pro-
tected guaranties. By a process of judicial metastasis it proliferated
Kent implications into Gault mandates. 77 Since this "metastasis" oc-
curred almost a year after Jerry was bound over to the criminal courts,
the court concluded that it was forced to decide whether Gault applied
retroactively to void his conviction.78
counsel . . . in the fact-finding and truth determining process. They could be analogous to
juvenile court hearings for determination of delinquency .... " State v. Steinhauer, 216
So.2d 214, 219 (Fla. 1968).
74. This issue will not be discussed at length, since this writer submits that Gideon is
determinative of the matter. For an excellent discussion of opposing views on this point
compare the dissenting opinion of Judge Swann in Richardson v. State ex rel. Milton, 219
So.2d 77, 81 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969) with the opinion of Judge Barns in Sult v. Weber, 210
So.2d 739 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968). Judge Swann felt that the impact which the absence of
counsel has on the integrity of the fact-finding process commanded retroactivity, while
Judge Barns was of the opinion that the reliance law enforcement authorities had placed on
pre-Gault law precluded it.
75. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
76. "The Court [in Kent] specifically announced that the 'Juvenile Court Act and the
decisions of' the Court of Appeal 'provide an adequate basis for decision . . . and we go
no further' 383 U.S. at 556 . . . ." State v. Steinhauer, 216 So.2d 214, 217-18 (Fla. 1968).
77. Id. A contrary view was expressed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
which stated that "we take the references to Kent in Gault as intended to describe the
development of statutory law respecting the right to counsel in juvenile court proceedings;
not as intended to extend the Kent decision beyond what it originally stood for." Cradle
v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 247, 156 S.E.2d 874, 877 (1967).
Undeterred by this two-way split of authority, a federal district court recently com-
pounded the confusion by holding that Gault did not apply retroactively to waiver hearings
even though it expressed no opinion as to whether Gault did elevate Kent to a constitution-
ally-based decision. Kemplen v. Maryland, 295 F. Supp. 8 (D. Md. 1969).
78. This writer is of the opinion that the retroactivity issue could have been avoided,
and Jerry granted relief, if the court would simply have recognized that Kent did, in fact,
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Proceeding to apply the approved formula for determining retro-
activity,79 the court concluded that, since the right to counsel was at
issue, the impact which the presence or absence of counsel would have
on "the integrity of the fact-finding process" was determinative of the
retroactivity vel non of Gault. 0 Stating that the ultimate fact, i.e.,
Jerry's guilt or innocence, was determined at the criminal trial where
Jerry had the assistance of counsel, the court concluded
The purpose of the new standard as applied to waiver [of
jurisdiction] hearings is merely to accomplish a broad aspect
of fairness and to guard against possible abuses of juveniles in
preliminary stages of the juvenile court proceedings. Actually,
at this stage of the proceeding the fact-finding process, in the
sense of a truth-determining medium, is seldom involved.8'
The court concluded, then, that since the integrity of the fact-finding
process was not affected by what occurred at the "mere waiver of juris-
diction phase," Gault did not apply retroactively. Jerry was "out of
court."
D. The Waiver Hearing as a Part of the
Fact-Finding Process
As previously emphasized, the United States Supreme Court has de-
nominated the entire adjudicatory process, from preliminary hearing to
appeal, as part of the fact-finding process in regard to retroactive appli-
cation of the right to counsel.8 In this regard it appears that in Stein-
hauer the Supreme Court of Florida gave an unduly restrictive definition
to the fact-finding process, considering it to occur only at the trial on the
merits. Based upon analogies to the criminal adjudicatory process, it is
submitted that the juvenile waiver of jurisdiction hearing is clearly a
step in the fact-finding process.
The court appears to have analogized the waiver of jurisdiction hear-
ing to a criminal preliminary hearing,83 which exists solely to determine
have a constitutional basis. Kent admittedly was based on an interpretation of the District
of Columbia juvenile statute; however, the interpretation was a constitutional one. The
court there emphasized "We believe that this result is required by the statute read in the
context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel."
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966). Thus the Court of Appeals of Kentucky,
prior to Gault, conduded: "In the light of the foregoing language we think there is no room
for debate on the question whether the present appellant was entitled to counsel in the
juvenile court [waiver] proceedings." Smith v. Commonwealth, 412 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Ky.
1967).
79. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
80. "The Supreme Court [has indicated] that a critical element in determining retro-
activity is the impact of the new rule on the reliability of the fact-finding process." State v.
Steinhauer, 216 So.2d 214, 218 (Fla. 1968).
See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
81. State v. Steinhauer, 216 So.2d 214, 219 (Fla. 1968).
82. See note 18 supra.
83. The court qualified its holding by stating that if, for example, the juvenile had
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if probable cause for detention and trial are present.8 4 In this analysis
the court finds support in a recent federal decision which stated that the
juvenile waiver of jurisdiction hearing "partakes more of a preliminary
hearing establishing probable cause for the initiation of further action." 5
It is submitted that such an analogy is erroneous and that a waiver
of jurisdiction hearing is best analogized to a sentencing hearing. In Kent,
the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the waiver hearing
actually determines the type of punishment the child is to receive. Under
the District of Columbia statute,
[t]he Juvenile Court is vested with "original and exclusive
jurisdiction" of the child. This jurisdiction confers special rights
and immunities. He is, as specified by the statute, shielded from
publicity. He may be confined, but with rare exceptions he may
not be jailed along with adults. He may be detained, but only
until he is 21 years of age .... The child is protected against
consequences of adult conviction such as the loss of civil rights,
the use of adjudication against him in subsequent proceedings,
and disqualification for public employment.86
The Florida statute is no different. The juvenile court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all juveniles. 7 The juvenile may not be
incarcerated beyond his majority.8 He does not suffer any of the normal
disabilities of a criminal conviction. 89 He is protected from publicity. °
Thus, the waiver of jurisdiction hearing does not merely determine
if there exists probable cause for further proceedings. It determines
qualitatively: whether a juvenile is to face four, five or six years of in-
carceration or ten years, life or possibly forfeiture of life itself; whether
he is to face the prospect of possibly being a convicted felon with all of
the disabilities thereunto appertaining; and whether his transgression is
to be kept confidential or broadcast to the world at large. In short, while
the hearing does not adjudicate guilt, it most certainly does adjudicate
the range of permissible sentences to be imposed if guilt is eventually
determined.
The true nature of the waiver hearing as a sentencing hearing is
made even clearer when one examines the evidence considered in de-
termining whether jurisdiction is to be waived. In deciding whether it
made a damaging admission at the waiver hearing which was subsequently used against
him then the absence of counsel would be critical. This is the rule which generally applies
to preliminary hearings. See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) ; Montgomery v. State,
176 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1965).
84. Baugus v. State, 141 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1962).
85. Kemplen v. Maryland, 295 F. Supp. 8 (D. Md. 1969).
86. 383 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1966).
87. FLA. STAT. § 39.02 (1967).
88. FLA. STAT. § 39.11(3) (1967).
89. FLA. STAT. § 39.10(3) (1967).
90. FLA. STAT. § 39.12 (1967).
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will waive jurisdiction, the juvenile court considers the seriousness of
the offense and any aggravating facts surrounding it, the prior record
of the juvenile, the juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation, etc.91 At
a preliminary hearing, however, the sole issue to be considered is
whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. 2
Thus, in both outcome and substance, the waiver of jurisdiction
hearing amounts to a sentencing hearing. At such hearings, "the ne-
cessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, introducing
evidence of mitigating circumstances and in general aiding and assist-
ing the defendant to present his case . . . is apparent."93 It is also
retroactive. 9
4
Even assuming the best analogy is to a preliminary hearing, it is
still evident that Jerry should have been retroactively given the bene-
fit of counsel. Although the accused does not normally have an abso-
lute right to counsel at a preliminary hearing, a right to counsel will
be deemed critical if something occurred at the preliminary hearing
which prejudiced him at later stages of the proceedings.95 This right
is also retroactive. 6 Because of something which occurred at the waiver
hearing, i.e., the waiver itself, Jerry, aside from the disabilities of a
felony conviction, is presently in Raiford Prison suffering five years
of prejudiceY It is thus apparent that Jerry was entitled to the re-
troactive benefit of counsel whether the waiver hearing is considered a
sentencing hearing or a preliminary hearing. The trend of the United
States Supreme Court is to make the right to counsel retroactive at
every stage of the adjudicatory process.
E. Conclusion
In Steinhauer, the Supreme Court of Florida refused to accord
the right to counsel retroactive application by holding that the fact-
finding process is limited to the trial on the merits. In so doing, it
ignored an undeviating line of United States Supreme Court decisions.
The Court further distinguished the waiver hearing from an adjudi-
catory hearing, calling it "the mere waiver of jurisdiction phase," and
stating that it is not attended by "awesome consequences." ' In so
doing it ignored the unequivocal statement of the United States Su-
preme Court that it is "clear beyond dispute that the waiver of juris-
91. In re B.P.W., 214 So.2d 365, 367-68 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
92. See text at note 82 supra.
93. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967).
94. McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968).
95. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
96. Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968).
97. Jerry received a ten year sentence in the criminal court. If the juvenile court had
not waived jurisdiction, Jerry, as a sixteen year old, would have faced a maximum possible
detention of five years. FLA. STAT. § 39.11(3) (1967).
98. 216 So.2d at 218.
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diction is a 'critically important' action determining vitally important
statutory rights of the juvenile." 9
It is submitted that the decision of the Florida Supreme Court
in Steinhauer was motivated primarily by a desire to avoid the cat-
astrophic situation which occurred after Gideon, when literally hun-
dreds of Florida prisoners had to be retried or released outright.10
Such fears are unfounded. There would be no need to wholly retry
the cases of juveniles who were bound over to criminal courts without
the assistance of counsel. The failure to have counsel at the waiver
hearing would in no way vitiate the adjudication of the criminal court
that the juvenile did in fact commit the illegal act. The sole issue for
determination (assuming that he committed the illegal act) would be
whether his prior record, the severity of the offense, and his prospects
for rehabilitation were such as to warrant treatment as an adult of-
fender. The juvenile court need simply hold a new waiver hearing
with counsel, and if it decides that the initial waiver was proper it
should leave the juvenile where he presently stands, i.e., on the adult
side. On the other hand, if it finds waiver to be unwarranted it should
simply order the felony adjudication vacated and all records trans-
ferred to the juvenile court. It would only need to decide whether the
juvenile had already "served enough time" for his transgression in
light of juvenile standards and then either release him or commit him
to the industrial school. In short, even if "Gideon's Trumpet" were
to sound again, its reverberations would not have the same impact as
before.
99. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
100. See note 62 supra.
